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NOTES AND COMMENTS
THE EFFECT OF PROVISIONS FOR ACCIDENTAL INJURIES
IN INSURANCE POLICIES
The term "accident" may give rise to various concepts ranging
from its etymological sense that "anything that happens"' can
be thus construed to the statement that "in the strictest sense
and dealing with the region of physical nature there is no such
thing as an accident.''2 While the legal concept is much nar-
rower, yet there has been much difficulty in giving a satisfactory
definition. The Supreme Court of our state acknowledges that
"no legal definition has been given or can be given which is both
exact and comprehensive as applied to all circumstances." 3 How.
ever, in all of the cases which have been recognized as accidents
there is the element of the unusual, the unexpected, and the
unforeseen. Even greater difficulty is experienced in fitting a given
set of facts either within or without any definition. In the last
analysis that is the problem which is reflected in the many cases
which have been taken to the higher courts, most of which involve
different factual situations.
Insurance contracts have usually been construed with a some-
what more liberal attitude toward the part of the insured than
ordinary contracts. This is a recognition of the fact that the
contracting parties are not on an equal footing. The contract is
already prepared, having been carefully drawn by legal experts
for the protection of the company, and the placing of the insur-
ance is really an act of bargain and sale of an existing commod-
ity rather than of the entering into of a contract. As the Supreme
Court of Illinois in an early case said, "a policy of accidental
insurance is issued and accepted for the purpose of furnishing
indemnity against accidents and death caused by accidental
means, and the language of the policy must be construed with
reference to the subject to which it is applied." 4
Most of the early policies designed to indemnify against acci-
dental injury or death merely specified that the coverage was
against such hazard caused by "accident." As the evolution of
1 See 1 C. J. S. 426.
2 So mentioned by Justice Cardozo in his dissenting opinion in the case of
Landress v. Phoenix Mut. L. Ins. Co., 291 U. S. 491, 54 S. Ct. 461, 78 L.
Ed. 934 (1934).
3 The Peru Plow and Wheel Company v. The Industrial Commission
et al., 311 Ill. 216, 142 N. E. 546 (1924).
4 Emma T. Healey v. The Mutual Accident Association of the Northwest,
133 Ill. 556, 25 N. E. 52 (1890).
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the decided cases brought more and more of the factual situations
within this coverage, the Insurance Companies made an attempt
to narrow the scope of the risk by insuring against injury or
death caused by "accidental means." The intention was to limit
their liability so as to exclude those cases where the act causing
the injury was intended but the result only unintended and to
include only those cases where the means or instrument causing
the death or injury was unintended and therefore the result un-
foreseen. Some- courts have followed this distinction but the
majority seem to have preferred the more liberal doctrine.5 In a
recent case6 Supreme Court Justice Cardozo, dissenting, said,
"When a man has died in such a way that his death is spoken
of as an accident, he has died because of an accident, and hence
by accidental means." He pointed out that "the attempted dis-
tinctions between accidental results and accidental means will
plunge this branch of the law into a Serbonian Bog," and he
concluded that "if there was no accident in the means, there
was none in the result, for the two were inseparable."
The growing popularity of policies of insurance against injury
through accidents and of double indemnity coverage against
death caused by accident may make it well worth while to call
attention to several recent cases illustrating the extreme liberality
in construction to which most modern decisions adhere. A recent
case illustrative of this tendency is that of Spence et al, v.
Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States.7 The
action was brought upon a life insurance policy with a double
indemnity clause furnishing protection against death resulting
"solely from bodily injury caused directly, exclusively and in-
dependently of all other causes by external, violent and purely ac-
cidental means...." The facts which were agreed upon indicated
that the insured died by taking an accidental overdose of barbital
or paraldehyde. He had previously taken the drug, and in the
instance in question, the facts indicate he took only such an
amount as he intended to take, but he did not intend to take
such an amount as to do him injury. The defendant contended
that even if the insured took what he intended to do and that his
death, even if it was unanticipated, was not death by "accidental
means." The court, however, after quoting liberally from several
5 Excellent annotations on various phases of the problem appear in 71
A. L. R. 1437, 90 A. L. R. 1381 and previous ones mentioned therein.
6 Landress v. Phoenix Mut. L. Ins. Co., 291 U. S. 491, 54 S. Ct. 461, 78 L.
Ed. 934 (1934).
' Spence v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 146 Kan. 216, 69 P. (2d)
713 (1937).
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cases and citing many, refused to follow the distinction between
accidental death, or what might be called the accidental result,
and the accidental means or causes; but on the other hand held
that the death constituted accidental means within the meaning
of the policy.
That this line of decision as typified by the foregoing case is
not peculiar to this country alone is indicated by another case
recently decided by the District Court of Alberta, Canada,
entitled Semkow v. Merchants Casualty Insurance Co.8 The ac-
tion was based upon a policy of accident insurance affording
protection "against loss caused by bodily injury sustained . . .
solely and independently of all other causes through sudden,
external, violent and accidental means." The plaintiff, while
intentionally bending over and attempting to lift a heavy jack
from the ground, strained the muscles of his back. This was one
of his ordinary and necessary duties and one which he had
performed upon many previous occasions. It was agreed by the
parties that the heavy weight of the jack caused the injury and
that the only question at issue was whether or not it was sus-
tained through "accidental means." In this case there was also
an attempt to distinguish accidental means from accident, which
the court, in holding that the injury came within the protection
of the policy, disposed of in the following language: "I confess
to a difficulty in seeing how an occurrence can be an accident
if the means or cause which produced it, especially the proximate
cause, was not an accident in the same sense of being unforeseen
and undesigned. If I intend and deliberately do a certain definite
act and from it there comes a result which I did not design or
even dream of, I certainly did not foresee or intend my act in its
nature and capacity as a cause effecting that result; nor can such
foresight and intention be imputed to me unless the result was
the natural and probable consequence of my act which I should
have foreseen. If, on the other hand, I did foresee and intend
the causal efficiency of the act, the event would not be an
accident.
"But whether in this I am right or wrong, the objection is,
I think, answered by Lord Robertson in his judgment 9 just
referred to at p. 452. Speaking of the contention that there was
nothing accidental in the matter since the man did what he in-
tended to do, he says: 'The fallacy of the argument lies in leav-
8 2 W. W. R. 669 (1937).
9 Referring to the case of Fenton v. Thorley & Co., Ltd., [1903] A. C.
443.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
ing out of account the miscalculation of forces, or inadvertence
to them, which is the element of mischance, mishap or misad-
venture.' "
After distinguishing several cases and citing others it refers
to the Pennsylvania case of the North American Life and Acci-
dent Insurance Co., v. Burroughs, ° in which the insured was
pitching hay and while doing so his pitchfork slipped through
his hands and struck him over the bowels causing peritoneal
inflammation, from which he died; in which Justice Williams
to an objection that the injury caused from a strain would not
be an accident, replied, "Why not, if he accidentally strained
himself? Why is not death resulting from an accidental strain
as much within the meaning of the policy as death produced by
any other accidental cause? If the injury be accidental and the
result of it death, what matters it whether the injury was caused
by a strain or a blow? . . .And there is no more reason for
regarding an injury of the abdominal muscles, caused by an
unexpected blow, an accident, than an injury caused by a
casual and unlooked for.strain."
From these decisions it would seem that the popular idea of
"accident" held by the man on the street, and now being followed
by most courts, is in the construction of insurance policies gradu-
ally replacing the strict legal interpretation usually followed in
contracts generally.
C. E. HACKLANDER
10 69 Pa. St. 43 (1871).
